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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











TOWNSHIP OF LYNDHURST, ROBERT GIANGERUSO, Lyndhurst Commissioner 
     
_______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court   
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:15-cv-07038) 
District Judge:  Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 25, 2021 
_______________ 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District Judge.* 
 








* The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KANE, District Judge. 
 David Sivella appeals from the District Court’s June 16, 2020 order granting 
summary judgment for Appellee Robert Giangeruso, the Mayor of the Township of 
Lyndhurst (the “Township”), based on qualified immunity.1  We will affirm.  
I.  Background 
After working on Giangeruso’s political campaigns in 2005 and 2009, Sivella held 
two different municipal jobs: part-time Associate Planner for the Township from 
approximately 2005 through 2013, and Bergen County Housing Department Director 
(“BCHD Director”) from approximately 2009 through 2011, holding both jobs 
simultaneously from 2009 to 2011.  One of Sivella’s responsibilities as BCHD Director 
was overseeing the Section 8 housing program.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.  Sivella 
voluntarily resigned from his position as BCHD Director in April 2011, continuing to 
work as an Associate Planner for the Township until 2013.   
In approximately June 2011, after he resigned as BCHD Director, Sivella was 
interviewed by the Bergen County Prosecutor and Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) investigators regarding Section 8 housing benefits received by Giangeruso’s 
mother.  Her Section 8 housing benefits were ultimately discontinued after HUD 
investigators determined that the configuration of the house in which she resided with 
Giangeruso did not meet the requirements for the Section 8 program.   
On September 10, 2013, at a Township public meeting, Township Commissioner 
 
1 Not relevant to this appeal is the District Court’s dismissal of Sivella’s remaining 
claims against the Township upon his consent.  
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Thomas DiMaggio expressed a concern that there were “no-show jobs” for several 
Township employees.  While no names were mentioned at the meeting, Sivella was one 
of three individuals thought to have had a no-show municipal job.   
Thereafter, on October 15, 2013, Giangeruso and Township Commissioner 
DiMaggio sent a letter to the Township Chief of Police requesting that he confidentially 
investigate the no-show municipal job allegations raised at the September public meeting.  
The letter did not disclose any names.  The record reflects that any investigation, to the 
extent one was conducted,2 “receiv[ed] no result anywhere.”  App. 355.  Sivella 
ultimately resigned from his position as an Associate Planner with the Township on 
October 28, 2013.   
Sivella filed a complaint against the Township and Giangeruso, alleging that 
Giangeruso and the Township (collectively, “Appellees”) retaliated against him for 
exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.3  On November 6, 2019, the 
District Court entered an order denying Appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to 
Sivella’s First Amendment retaliation claims for the following reasons: (1) “there is a 
genuine factual dispute as to whether a person of ordinary firmness would be deterred 
from speaking out because of [Appellees’] retaliatory acts, including Giangeruso and 
 
2  Sivella was never contacted or questioned by any law enforcement agency 
related to any investigation into no-show municipal jobs.   
3  His complaint also asserted a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 10:6-1, et seq., for violation of his First Amendment rights, and common law 
claims of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress.  Upon Sivella’s concession that his common law claims failed as a 
matter of law, the District Court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to 
those claims.   
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Litterio’s threatening statements and Giangeruso’s investigation into [Sivella’s] job”;4 (2) 
“there is a genuine [dispute] of material fact with respect to the causation element [of a 
First Amendment retaliation claim], because a reasonable fact-finder could infer a 
‘pattern of antagonism’ between [Sivella] and Giangeruso and a ‘temporal proximity’ 
between Giangeruso’s Section 8 subsidy being discontinued in 2013, Giangeruso blaming 
Sivella for the investigation into that subsidy, and Giangeruso subsequently opening an 
investigation into [Sivella’s] job after the September 10, 2013 Commissioners’ meeting”; 
and (3) Giangeruso was not entitled to qualified immunity because he failed to show that 
“he did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.”  App. 416-17. 
In granting Appellees’ motion for reconsideration of its November 6, 2019 order, 
the District Court found that, in requesting an investigation into no-show municipal jobs 
in October 2013, Giangeruso had not violated any clearly established right, and was 
therefore entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment as to Sivella’s First 
Amendment retaliation claims.   
II.  Discussion 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment and we apply the same standard as the 
District Court.  Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review de novo the 
 
4  Carmen Litterio was the Deputy Police Chief of the Township.   
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legal grounds underpinning a claim of qualified immunity.  Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 
273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 Before us, Sivella contends that the District Court erred in granting Appellees’ 
motion for reconsideration and reversing its prior ruling that Giangeruso was not entitled 
to qualified immunity on Sivella’s First Amendment retaliation claims.  Further, Sivella 
maintains that genuine disputes of material fact exist with respect to his First Amendment 
retaliation claims.  In connection with his first argument, Sivella asserts that the District 
Court erroneously relied on dicta from Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), and a 
non-precedential decision of a panel of this Court in Holt v. Pennsylvania, 683 F. App’x 
151 (3d Cir. 2017), in finding that Sivella’s “right to be free from a retaliatory 
investigation based on his engaging in protected speech” was not clearly established at 
the time Giangeruso sent a letter to the Township Police Chief requesting the initiation of 
an investigation into no-show municipal jobs in October 2013.   
 We find that the District Court properly concluded that Giangeruso was entitled to 
qualified immunity because, at the time he requested the initiation of an investigation into 
no-show municipal jobs in 2013, it was not clearly established that, assuming the 
investigation was requested in retaliation for protected speech, such an adverse action 
amounted to a First Amendment violation.   
 “[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”  Bayer v. 
Monroe Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
6 
 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).  “Clearly established” means that “there 
must be sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually similar to the plaintiff’s 
allegations, to put defendant on notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally 
prohibited.”  Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001)).  We first 
look to applicable Supreme Court precedent, but if none exists, “a ‘robust consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority’ in the Court[s] of Appeals could clearly establish a right for 
purposes of qualified immunity.”  Id. (quoting Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 826 
(2015) (per curiam)). 
 The right that Sivella alleges Giangeruso violated is his right to be free from a 
request for an investigation into his employment in retaliation for the exercise of his First 
Amendment rights.  A claim for First Amendment retaliation requires: “(1) 
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between 
the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”  Thomas v. Indep. 
Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).  As noted above, Sivella alleges that Giangeruso 
retaliated against him for his statements to HUD investigators in 2011 by requesting the 
initiation of an investigation into whether he held a no-show municipal job in October 
2013.  Accordingly, Giangeruso’s entitlement to qualified immunity turns on whether, in 
October 2013, it was clearly established that a request for an investigation could 
constitute a retaliatory act for purposes of the First Amendment.   
In Hartman, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging a speech-based 
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retaliatory prosecution claim must plead and prove an absence of probable cause to 
support the criminal charge underlying the retaliation claim.  547 U.S. at 252.  In dicta, 
the Supreme Court stated that it had not established that a retaliatory investigation was a 
“constitutional violation.”  Id. at 262 n.9.  Since Hartman, no Supreme Court case has 
addressed the issue of whether the initiation of a retaliatory investigation can constitute a 
First Amendment violation.  As this Court has previously stated, an absence of relevant 
Supreme Court precedent strongly supports a finding that a particular right is not clearly 
established.  Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 639 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(stating that “[i]n order for a right to be clearly established there must be applicable 
precedent from the Supreme Court”).   
Moreover, in 2013, there existed no “robust consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority” clearly establishing a right to be free from a retaliatory investigation.  
Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Sivella 
argues that the District Court erroneously relied on Holt, wherein a panel of this Court 
observed that we had “not considered whether the initiation of an internal investigation 
can constitute an adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim, and 
our sister circuits are split on the issue.”  683 F. App’x at 154.  We recognize that Holt 
was a non-precedential opinion, which does not constitute binding precedent.  See 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 5.7 (2018).  What is significant, however, is that there was and remains a circuit 
split on the relevant issue.  Compare, e.g., Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 158 
(5th Cir. 2000) (finding that “[i]nvestigating alleged violations of departmental policies . . 
. [is] not [an] adverse employment action”), with Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 
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1078-79 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that placement on administrative leave pending 
discipline can constitute an adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation 
claim). 
 In view of the above authority (or lack thereof), we easily conclude that, in 
October 2013, when Giangeruso sent a letter requesting the initiation of an investigation 
of no-show municipal jobs by the Township Chief of Police, allegedly in retaliation for 
Sivella’s protected speech, it was not clearly established that such an adverse action 
amounted to a First Amendment violation.  Accordingly, the District Court correctly 
concluded that Giangeruso was entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment as 
to Sivella’s First Amendment retaliation claims.  In light of the Court’s conclusion 
regarding Giangeruso’s entitlement to qualified immunity, we need not reach Sivella’s 
argument regarding the existence of material factual disputes as to certain elements of his 
First Amendment retaliation claims. 
III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
Appellees’ motion for reconsideration and summary judgment in favor of Giangeruso. 
